How much science should there be in philosophy?

Conference season means a lot of travelling and catching up with friends. This year I have been particularly fortunate to present my work on chemical reactions not just in conferences that are dedicated to the philosophy of chemistry, but also in events that are interested more broadly in philosophy and philosophy of science. 

Discussing chemistry in philosophy conferences is not particularly common and it is difficult to find more than three or four researchers of chemistry at such events. In fact, the more international, popular or competitive a conference, the harder it is to find philosophers of chemistry participating in it. Part of the reason is that philosophers are more interested in studying mathematics, physics and biology. What motivates interests in these sciences over chemistry has partly to do with one’s views on how chemistry relates to fundamental physics. But another reason for having a smaller representation in the community has to do with a very passionate debate about the role science in general should play in philosophical investigations.¹ 

On this front, things really heated up with the publication of the book Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised, by James Ladyman and Don Ross.² The now notorious first chapter was a critique against what is dubbed analytic or armchair metaphysics. In general, metaphysics refers to the study of the world and its fundamental ontological categories. What exists (if anything); how do things in the world relate to each other; are there kinds of things; and, do things have intrinsic properties? If you are puzzled about what these questions actually try to uncover, you are not alone! For a long time, it has been argued that these questions (and more importantly, the answers given to them) are not just obscure but completely detached from the knowledge humanity has gathered through science. 

Ladyman and Ross believe that the reason for this obscurity lies in how philosophers perceive the role of science in philosophy. Specifically, analytic metaphysics maintains that one cannot understand the world by looking only at the sciences. Instead, in its more extreme forms, doing analytic metaphysics amounts to investigating the world without considering scientific knowledge – it is an independent research programme that, just like the sciences, can provide the sole basis for how we understand the world. 

It is against this method of doing philosophy that Ladyman and Ross argue. The problem, they claim, is that it can lead to philosophical conclusions that contradict what science says about the world, which is unacceptable. Our understanding of the world around us (whether through metaphysics or other means) cannot go against our best scientific knowledge. Not only that, the right way of doing metaphysics requires a close investigation of science and its results. Looking at physics, chemistry and biology is vital to making coherent and justified claims about the world. This way of doing philosophy is called naturalised metaphysics. 

A chemist might be surprised that this is even a matter of contention. Obviously, if science says that atoms are not indivisible then this should inform how philosophers spell out their views about the most fundamental ontological categories. Yet, there is still debate in the community; not so much about whether science should inform metaphysics, but to what extent it should and could do so.³ 

Metaphysics is ineliminable from science

This is to some extent understandable. The degree of specialisation required to understand quantum physics or chemistry or biology is very demanding, so much so that even scientists themselves are often unaware of big chunks of their own disciplines. This becomes even harder for philosophers, who must train in the natural sciences on top of studying philosophy. This also explains the extensive fragmentation of philosophy of science into philosophy of physics, biology, chemistry and so on. Practically, philosophers cannot focus on all sciences at once and there is a degree of specialisation required when studying a particular science from a philosophical perspective. 

Moreover, there are some philosophers, such as Anjan Chakravartty, who believe that science itself involves making assumptions that are not solely based on the results of scientific or empirical investigations.⁴ Metaphysics is ineliminable from science in the sense that even when it comes to interpreting empirical observations (of, say, an experiment), scientists are influenced by their background beliefs about what the world is like, which in turn are not exclusively determined by their study of science. 

Science (including chemistry) benefits from philosophy. Spelling out how exactly science should relate to philosophical investigations is very important for clarifying the ways in which philosophy contributes to scientific progress. From this perspective, the debate between analytic and naturalised metaphysics should not be viewed as an esoteric disagreement among philosophers but as a valuable means to explain philosophy’s value to our understanding of the world.